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Abstract
This manuscript presents some new impossibil-
ity results on adversarial robustness in machine
learning, a very important yet largely open prob-
lem. We show that if conditioned on a class label
the data distribution satisfies the W2 Talagrand
transportation-cost inequality (for example, this
condition is satisfied if the conditional distribu-
tion has density which is log-concave; is the uni-
form measure on a compact Riemannian mani-
fold with positive Ricci curvature; etc.) any clas-
sifier can be adversarially fooled with high prob-
ability once the perturbations are slightly greater
than the natural noise level in the problem. We
call this result The Strong ”No Free Lunch” The-
orem as some recent results (Tsipras et al. 2018,
Fawzi et al. 2018, etc.) on the subject can be
immediately recovered as very particular cases.
Our theoretical bounds are demonstrated on both
simulated and real data (MNIST). We conclude
the manuscript with some speculation on possi-
ble future research directions.
1. Introduction
An adversarial attack operates as follows:
• A classifier is trained and deployed (e.g the road traffic
sign recognition system on a self-driving car).
• At test / inference time, an attacker may submit
queries to the classifier by sampling a data point x
with true label k, and modifying it x→ xadv according
to a prescribed threat model. For example, modifying
a few pixels on a road traffic sign (Su et al., 2017),
modifying intensity of pixels by a limited amount de-
termined by a prescribed tolerance level  (Tsipras
et al., 2018), etc. , on it.
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• The goal of the attacker is to fool the classifier into
classifying xadv as label different from k.
• A robust classifier tries to limit this failure mode, at a
prescribed tolerance .
1.1. A toy example illustrating the fundamental issue
To motivate things, consider the following ”toy” problem
from (Tsipras et al., 2018), which consists of classifying a
target Y ∼ Bern(1/2, {±1}) based on p ≥ 2 explanatory
variables X := (X1, X2, . . . , Xp) given by
X1|Y =
{
+Y, w.p 70%,
−Y, w.p 30%,
andXj |Y ∼ N (ηY, 1), for j = 2, . . . , p, where η ∼ p−1/2
is a fixed scalar which (as we wll see) controls the dif-
ficulty of the problem. Now, as was shown in (Tsipras
et al., 2018), the above problem can be solved perfectly
with generalization accuracy ≈ 100%, but the ”champion”
estimator can also be fooled, perfectly! Indeed, the lin-
ear estimator given by havg(x) := sign(wTx) with w =
(0, 1/(p − 1), . . . , 1/(p − 1)) ∈ Rp, where we allow an
attacked to modify each feature by an amount at moust
 ≈ 2η, has the afore-mentioned properties. Indeed, us-
ing basic tail bounds for the Gaussian distributions, one can
show that for any δ ∈ (0, 1] the following hold
• The standard accuracy of the linear model havg is at
least 1− δ if η ≥√2 log(1/δ)/(p− 1), and
• This same model’s adversarial accuracy is at most δ
for  ≥ η +√2 log(1/δ)/(p− 1)
See (Tsipras et al., 2018) for details (or see supplemental).
By the way, we note that an optimal adversarial attack can
be done by taking ∆x1 = 0 and ∆xj = −y for all j =
2, . . . , p.
An autopsy of what is going on. Recall that the entropy
of a univariate Gaussian is Ent(N (µ, σ)) = ln(√2piσe)
nats. Now, for j = 2, 3, . . . , p, the distribution of feature
Xj is a Gaussian mixture 12
∑
Y=±1N (ηY, 1) and so one
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computes the mutual information betweenXj and the class
label Y as
MI(Xj ;Y ) := Ent(Xj)− Ent(Xj |Y )
= Ent
(
1
2
∑
y=±1
N (ηy, 1)
)
− 1
2
∑
y=±1
Ent(N (ηy, 1))
= ln(
√
2pie) + η2 − r − 2(1/2) ln(
√
2pie) = η2 − r ≤ η2,
where (see (Michalowicz et al., 2008) for the details)
r :=
2√
2piη
e−η
2/2
∫ ∞
0
e
− z2
2η2 cosh(z) ln(cosh(z))dz ≥ 0.
Thus MI(Xj ;Y ) ≤ η2. Since η2 ∼ 1/p, we conclude
that these features barely share any information with the
target variable Y . Indeed, (Tsipras et al., 2018) showed
improved robustness on the above problem, with feature-
selection based on mutual information.
Basic “No Free Lunch” Theorem. Reading the infor-
mation calculations above, a skeptic could point out that
the underlying issue here is that the estimator havg over-
exploits the fragile / non-robust variables X2, . . . , Xp to
boost ordinary generalization accuracy, at the expense of
adversarial robustness. However, it was rigorously shown
in (Tsipras et al., 2018) that on this particular problem, ev-
ery estimator is vulnerable. Precisely, the authors proved
the following basic “No Free Lunch” theorem.
Theorem 1 (Basic No Free Lunch, (Tsipras et al., 2018)).
For the problem above, any estimator which has ordinary
accuracy at least 1 − δ must have robust adversarial ro-
bustness accuracy at most 7δ/3 against `∞-perturbations
of maximum size  ≥ 2η.
1.2. Highlight of our main contributions
In this manuscript, we prove that under some “curvature
conditions” (to be precised later) on the conditional density
of the data, it holds that
For geodesic / faithful attacks:
• Every (non-perfect) classifier can be adversarially
fooled with high probability by moving sample points
an amount less than a critical value, namely
(h|k) := σk
√
2 log(1/ err(h|k)) ≈ σkΦ−1(acc(h|k))
along the data manifold, where σk is the “natural
noise level” in the data points with class label k and
err(h|k) generalization error of the classifier in the
non-adversarial setting
• Moreover, the average distance of a sample point of
true label k to the error set is upper-bounded by
(h|k) + σk
√
pi
2
= σk
(
Φ−1(acc(h|k)) +
√
pi
2
)
For attacks in flat space Rp:
• In particular, if the data points live in Rp, where p is
the number of features), then every classifier can be
adversarially fooled with high probability, by chang-
ing each feature by an amount less than a critical
value, namely
∞(h|k) := σk
√
2 log(1/ err(h|k))/p
≈ σk√
p
Φ−1(acc(h|k)).
• Moreover, we have the bound
d(h|k) ≤ ∞(h|k) + σk√
p
√
pi
2
≈ σk√
p
(
Φ−1(acc(h|k)) +
√
pi
2
)
.
In fact, we prove similar results for `1 (reminiscent of few-
pixel attacks (Su et al., 2017)) and even any `s norm onRp.
We call these results The Strong “No Free Lunch” Theo-
rem as some recent results (e.g (Tsipras et al., 2018; Fawzi
et al., 2018a; Gilmer et al., 2018b)), etc.) on the subject can
be immediately recovered as very particular cases. Thus
adversarial (non-)robustness should really be thought of as
a measure of complexity of a problem. A similar remark
has been recently made in (Bubeck et al., 2018).
The sufficient “curvature conditions” alluded to above im-
ply concentration of measure phenomena, which in turn
imply our impossibility bounds. These conditions are satis-
fied in a large number of situations, including cases where
the class-conditional distribution is the volume element of
a compact Riemannian manifold with positive Ricci cur-
vature; the class-conditional data distribution is supported
on a smooth manifold and has log-concave density w.r.t the
curvature of the manifold; or the manifold is compact; is
the pushforward via a Lipschitz continuous map, of another
distribution which verifies these curvature conditions; etc.
1.3. Notation and terminology
X will denote the feature space and Y := {1, 2, . . . ,K}
will be the set of class labels, where K ≥ 2 is the number
of classes, with K = 2 for binary classification. P will be
the (unknown) joint probability distribution over X × Y ,
of two prototypical random variables X and Y referred to
the features and the target variable, which take values in X
and Y respectively. Random variables will be denoted by
capital letters X , Y , Z, etc., and realizations thereof will
be denoted x, y, z, etc. respectively.
For a given class label k ∈ Y , Xk ⊆ X will denote the set
of all samples whose label is k with positive probability un-
der P . It is the support of the restriction of P onto the plane
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X × {k}. This restriction is denoted PX|Y=k or just PX|k,
and defines the conditional distribution of the features X
given that the class label has the value k. We will assume
that all the Xk’s are finite-dimensional smooth Riemannian
manifolds. This is the so-called manifold assumption, and
is not unpopular in machine learning literature. A classifier
is just a measurable mapping h : X → Y , from features to
class labels.
Threat models. Let dX be a distance / metric on the in-
put space X and  ≥ 0 be a tolerance level. The dX
threat model at tolerance  is a scenario where the attacker
is allowed to perturb any input point x 7→ xadv, with the
constraint that dX (xadv, x) ≤ . When X is a manifold,
the threat model considered will be that induced by the
geodesic distance, and will be naturally referred to as the
geodesic threat model.
Flat threat models. In the special case of euclidean
space X = Rn, we will always consider the distances de-
fined for q ∈ [1,∞] by d(x, z) = ‖x− z‖q , where
‖a‖q :=

(∑p
j=1 |aj |q
)1/q
, if 1 ≤ q <∞,
max{|a1|, . . . , |ap|}, if q =∞.
(1)
The `∞ / sup case where q = ∞ (Tsipras et al., 2018) is
particularly important: the corresponding threat model al-
lows the adversary to separately increase or decrease each
feature by an amount at most . The sparse case q = 1 is a
convex proxy for so-called “few-pixel” attacks (Su et al.,
2017) wherein the total number of features that can be
tampered-with by the adversary is limited.
Adversarial robustness accuracy and error. The ad-
versarial robustness accuracy of h at tolerance  for a
class label k ∈ Y and w.r.t the dX threat model, denoted
accdX ,(h|k), is defined by
accdX ,(h|k) := PX|k(h(x′) = k ∀x′ ∈ BallX (X; )). (2)
This is simply the probability no sample point x with true
class label k can be perturbed by an amount ≤  measured
by the distance dX , so that it get misclassified by h. This
is an adversarial version of the standard class-conditional
accuracy acc(h) = P(X,Y )(h(X) = Y ) corresponding to
 = 0. The corresponding adversarial robustness error
is then err(h|k) := 1 − acc(h|k). This is the adversar-
ial analogue of the standard notion of the class-conditional
generalization / test error, corresponding to  = 0.
Similarly, one defines the unconditional adversarial accu-
racy
acc(h) = P(X,Y )(h(x
′) = Y ∀x′ ∈ BallX (X; )), (3)
which is an adversarial version of the standard accuracy
acc(h) = P(X,Y )(h(X) = Y ). Finally, adversarial ro-
bustness radius of h on class k
d(h|k) := EX|k[d(X,B(h, k))], (4)
where B(h, k) := {x ∈ X |h(x) 6= k} is the set of inputs
classified by h as being of label other than k. Measureablity
of h implies that B(h, k) is a Borel subset of X . d(x, k) is
nothing but the average distance of a sample point x ∈ X
with true label k, from the set of samples classified by h
as being of another label. The smaller the value of d(h|k),
the less robust the classifier h is to adversarial attacks on
samples of class k.
Remark 1. By the properties of expectation and con-
ditioning, it holds that mink acc(h|k) ≤ acc(h) =
EY [acc(h|Y )] =
∑K
k=1 pik acc(h|k) ≤ maxk acc(h|k),
where pik := P (k). Thus, bounds on the acc(h|k)’s imply
bounds on acc(h).
1.4. Rough organization of the manuscript
In section 1.1, we start off by presenting a simple moti-
vating classification problem from (Tsipras et al., 2018),
which as shown by the authors, already exhibits the “No
Free Lunch” issue. In section 2.1 we present some rel-
evant notions from geometric probability theory which
will be relevant for our work, especially Talagrand’s
transportation-cost inequality and also Marton’s blowup
Lemma. Then in section 2.3, we present the main result
of this manuscript, namely, that on a rich set of distribu-
tions no classifier can be robust even to modest perturba-
tions (comparable to the natural noise level in the problem).
This generalizes the results of (Tsipras et al., 2018; Gilmer
et al., 2018b) and to some extent, (Fawzi et al., 2018a).
Our results also extend to the distributional robustness set-
ting (no highlighted here but is presented in the Appendix
B).
An in-depth presentation of related works is given in sec-
tion 3. Section 4 presents experiments on both simulated
and real data that confirm our theoretical results. Finally,
section 5 concludes the manuscript with possible future re-
search directions.
All proofs are presented in Appendix A.
2. The theorems
2.1. Terminology and background
Neighborhood of a set in a metric space. The -blowup
(aka -neighborhood, aka -fattening, aka -enlargement)
of a subset B of a metric space X = (X , dX ), denoted
BX , is defined by B

X := {x ∈ X |dX (x,B) ≤ }, where
dX (x,B) := inf{dX (x, y)|y ∈ B} is the distance of x
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from B. Note that BX is an increasing function of both
B and ; that is, if A ⊆ B ⊆ X and 0 ≤ 1 ≤ 2, then
A ⊆ A1X ⊆ B1X ⊆ B2X . In particular, B0X = B and
B∞X = X . Also observe that each BX can be rewritten in
the form BX =
⊔
x∈B BallX (x; ), where BallX (x; ) :=
{x′ ∈ X |dX (x′, x) ≤ } the closed ball in X with cen-
ter x and radius . Refer to Fig. 1. In a bid to simplify
B
BX
Figure 1. -blowup of a subset B of a metric space X .
notation, when there is no confusion about the underlying
metric space, we will simply write B for BX . When there
is no confusion about the the underlying set X but not the
metric thereupon, we will write BdX . For example, in the
metric space (Rp, `q), we will writeB`q instead ofB

(Rp,`q)
for the -blowup of B ⊆ Rp.
An example which will be central to us is when h : X → Y
is a classifier, k ∈ Y is a class label, and we take B to be
the “bad set” B(h, k) ⊆ X of inputs which are assigned a
label different from k, i.e
B(h, k) := {x|h(x) 6= k} =
⊔
k′ 6=k
{x|h(x) = k′}. (5)
BX = B(h, k)
 is then nothing but the event that there is
data point with a “bad -neighbor”, i.e the example can be
missclassified by applying a small perturbation of size≤ .
This interpretation of blowups will be central in the sequel,
and we will be concerned with lower-bounding the proba-
bility of the event B(h, k) under the conditional measure
PX|k. This is the proportion of points x ∈ X with true class
label k, such that h assigns a label 6= k to some -neighbor
x′ ∈ X of x. Alternatively, one could study the local ro-
bustness radii rh(x, k) := inf{d(x′, x)|x′ ∈ X , h(x′) 6=
k} =: d(x,B(h, k)), for (x, k) ∼ P , as was done in
(Fawzi et al., 2018a), albeit for a very specific problem set-
ting (generative models with Guassian noise). More on this
in section 3. Indeed rh(x, k) ≤  ⇐⇒ x ∈ B(h, k).
2.2. Isoperimetric inequalities in general metric spaces
All known theoretical works (Tsipras et al., 2018; Schmidt
et al., 2018; Gilmer et al., 2018b; Fawzi et al., 2018a;
Mahloujifar et al., 2018; Shafahi et al., 2018) on the impos-
sibility of adversarial robustness use the Gaussian isoperi-
metric inequality in euclidean space (Boucheron et al.,
2013). Via the classical work of Le´vy-Gromov, one can
extend this to compact simply connected Riemannian man-
ifolds with positive Ricci curvature. For general metric
spaces, with which we are concerned, it is not even clear
what should be the appropriate notion of curvature. Vil-
lani and co-workers have solved this issue by developing
a so-called synthetic theory of curvature, based on optimal
transport. The resulting geometric framework allows for
an extension (due mostly to F. Otto and C. Villani, but also
M. Talagrand and K. Marton) of Le´vy-Gromov theory to
metric spaces (Villani, 2008).
Fix a reference measure µ in P2(X ), the Wasserstein space
of all probability measures µ on the metric space X with
finite order moment, i.e such that there exists a point a ∈ X
with EX∼µ[dX (a,X)2] <∞. Let c ≥ 0.
Definition 1 (T2(c) property –a.k.a Talagrand W2 trans-
portation-cost inequality). µ is said to satisfy T2(c) if for
every other distribution ν on X , which is absolutely con-
tinuous w.r.t µ (written ν  µ), one has
W2(ν, µ) ≤
√
2c kl(ν‖µ), (6)
where W2(ν, µ) :=
(
inf
pi∈Π(ν,µ)
Epi[dX (X ′, X)2]
)1/2
is the
Wasserstein 2-distance between ν and µ, with Π(ν, µ) be-
ing the set of all couplings of ν and µ; and kl(ν‖µ) is
the entropy of ν relative to µ, defined by kl(ν‖µ) =∫
X log(
dν
dµ )dµ if ν  µ and +∞ else.
Note that if 0 ≤ c ≤ c′, then T2(c) ⊆ T2(c′). The in-
equality (6) in the above definition is a generalization of
the well-known Pinsker’s inequality for the total variation
distance between probability measures. Unlike Pinsker’s
inequality which holds unconditionally, (6) is a privilege
only enjoyed by special classes of reference distributions
µ. These include: log-concave distributions on manifolds
(e.g multi-variate Gaussian), distributions on compact Rie-
mannian manifolds of positive Ricci curvature (e.g spheres,
tori, etc.), pushforwards of distributions that satisfy some
T2 inequality, etc. In section 2.5, these classes of distribu-
tions will be discussed in detail as sufficient conditions for
our impossibility theorems.
Definition 2 (BLOWUP(c) property). µ is said to satisfy
BLOWUP(c) if for every BorelB ⊆ X with µ(B) > 0 and
for every  ≥√2c log(1/µ(B)), it holds that
µ(B) ≥ 1− e− 12c (−
√
2c log(1/µ(B)))2 . (7)
It is a classical result that the Gaussian distribution on
Rp has BLOWUP(1) and T2(1), a phenomenon known as
Gaussian isoperimetry. These results date back to at least
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works of E. Borel, P. Le´vy, M. Talagrand and of K. Marton
(Boucheron et al., 2013).
The following lemma is the most important tool we will use
to derive our bounds.
Lemma 1 (Marton’s Blowup lemma). On a fixed metric
space, it holds that T2(c) ⊆ BLOWUP (c).
Proof. The proof is classical, and is provided in Appendix
A for the sake of completeness.
The Otto-Villani theory (Villani, 2008) showed that there
are even more primitive so-called log-Sobolev inequalities
which imply T2 inequalities, and therefore by Lemma 1,
imply measure concentration.
2.3. Generalized “No Free Lunch” Theorem
It is now ripe to present the main results of this manuscript.
Theorem 2 (Strong “No Free Lunch” on curved space).
Suppose that for some σk > 0, PX|k has the T2(σ2k) prop-
erty on the conditional manifold Xk := supp(PX|k) ⊆ X .
Given a classifier h : X → {1, 2, . . . ,K} for which
acc(h|k) < 1 (i.e the classifier is not perfect on the class
k), define
(h|k) := σk
√
2 log(1/ err(h|k)) ≈ σkΦ−1(acc(h|k)). (8)
Then for the geodesic threat model, we have the bounds
(A) Adversarial robustness accuracy: If  ≥ (h|k), then
acc(h|k) ≤ min(acc(h|k), e
− 1
2σ2
k
(−(h|k))2
). (9)
(B) Bound on average distance to error set:
d(h|k) ≤ σk
(√
log(1/ err(h|k)) +
√
pi
2
)
≈ σk
(
Φ−1(acc(h|k)) +
√
pi
2
)
.
(10)
Proof. The main idea is to invoke Lemma 1, and then apply
the bound (7) with B = B(h, k) := {x ∈ X |h(x) 6= k},
µ = PX|k, and c = σ2k. See Appendix A for details.
In the particular case of attacks happening in euclidean
space (this is the default setting in the literature), the above
theorem has the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Strong “No Free Lunch” Theorem on flat
space). Let 1 ≤ q ≤ ∞, and define
q(h|k) := (h|k)p 1q− 12 ≈ p 1q− 12σkΦ−1(acc(h|k)). (11)
If in addition to the assumptions of Theorem 2 the condi-
tional data manifold Xk is flat, i.e RicXk = 0, then for the
`q threat model, we have
(A1) Adversarial robustness accuracy: If  ≥ q(h|k),
then
acc(h|k) ≤ min(acc(h|k), e
− p1−2/q
2σ2
k
(−q(h|k))2
). (12)
(A2) Average distance to error set: if  ≥ q(h|k), then
d(h|k) ≤ σk
p1/2−1/q
(√
log(1/ err(h|k)) +
√
pi/2
)
=
σk
p1/2−1/q
(
Φ−1(acc(h|k)) +
√
pi/2
)
.
(13)
In particular, for the `∞ threat model, we have
(B1)Adversarial robustness accuracy: if  ≥ (h|k)√p , then
acc(h|k) ≤ min(acc(h|k), e
− p
2σ2
k
(−(h|k)/√p)2
). (14)
(B2) Bound on average distance to error set:
d(h|k) ≤ σk√
p
(√
log(1/ err(h|k)) +
√
pi/2
)
=
σk√
p
(
Φ−1(acc(h|k)) +
√
pi/2
)
.
(15)
Proof. See Appendix A.
2.4. Making sense of the theorems
Fig. 2 gives an instructive illustration of bounds in
the above theorems. For perfect classifiers, the test er-
ror err(h|k) := 1 − acc(h|k) is zero and so the fac-
tor
√
log(1/ err(h|k)) appearing in definitions for (h|k)
and q(h|k) is∞; else this classifier-specific factor grows
only very slowly (the log function grows very slowly)
as acc(h|k) increases towards the perfect limit where
acc(h|k) = 1. As predicted by Corollary 1, we ob-
serve in Fig. 2 that beyond the critical value  =
∞(h|k) := σ
√
2 log(1/ err(h|k))/p, the adversarial ac-
curacy acc(h|k) decays at a Gaussian rate, and eventually
acc(h|k) ≤ err(h|k) as soon as  ≥ 2∞(h|k).
Comparing to the Gaussian special case (see section 2.5 be-
low), we see that the curvature parameter σk appearing in
the theorems is an analogue to the natural noise-level in the
problem. The flat case Xk = Rp with an `∞ threat model
is particularly instructive. The critical values of , namely
∞(h|k) and 2∞(h|k) beyond which the compromising
conclusions of the Corollary 1 come into play is propor-
tional to σk/
√
p.
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Finally note that the `1 threat model corresponding to q = 1
in Corollary 1, is a convex proxy for the “few-pixel” threat
model which was investigated in (Su et al., 2017).
2.5. Some consequences of the theorems
Recall that PX|k is the distribution of the inputs conditional
on the class label being k and Xk is the support of PX|k.
It turns out that the general “No Free Lunch” Theorem 2
and Corollary 1 apply to a broad range of problems, with
certain geometric constraints on PX|k and Xk. We discuss
a non-exhaustive list of examples hereunder.
2.5.1. LOG-CONCAVE ON A RIEMANNIAN MANIFOLD
Consider a conditional data model of the form PX|k ∝
e−vk(x)dx on a d-dimensional Riemannian manifold Xk ⊆
X satisfying the Bakry-Emer´y curvature condition (Bakry
& E´mery, 1985)
Hessx(vk) + Ricx(X )  (1/σ2k)Ip, (16)
for some σk > 0. Such a distribution is called log-concave.
By Corollary 1.1 of (Otto & Villani, 2000) (and Corollary
3.2 of (Bobkov & Goetze, 1999)), PX|k has the T2(σ2k)
property and therefore by Lemma 1, the BLOWUP(σ2k)
property, and Theorem 2 (and Corollary 1 for flat space)
applies.
The Holley-Stroock perturbation Theorem ensures that if
PX|k ∝ e−vk(x)−uk(x)dx where uk is bounded, then The-
orem 2 (and Corollary 1 for flat space) holds with the
noise parameter σk degraded to σ˜k := σkeosc(uk), where
osc(uk) := supx uk(x)− infx uk(x) ≥ 0.
2.5.2. ELLIPTICAL GAUSSIAN IN EUCLIDEAN SPACE
Consider the flat manifold Xk = Rp and multi-variate
Gaussian distribution PX|k ∝ e−vk(x)dx thereupon, where
vk(x) =
1
2 (x − mk)TΣ−1k (x − mk), for some vector
mk ∈ Rp (called the mean) and positive-definite matrix
Σk (called the covariance matrix) all of whose eigenvalues
are ≤ σ2k. A direct computation gives Hess(vk) + Ricx 
1/σ2k + 0 = 1/σ
2
k for all x ∈ Rp. So this is an instance
of the above log-concave example, and so the same bounds
hold. Thus we get an elliptical version (and therefore a
strict generalization) of the basic “No Free Lunch” theorem
in (Tsipras et al., 2018), with exactly the same constants in
the bounds. These results are also confirmed empirically in
section 4.1.
2.5.3. VOLUME MEASURE ON COMPACT RIEMANNIAN
MANIFOLD WITH POSITIVE RICCI CURVATURE
Indeed the distribution dPX|k = dvol(Xk)/vol(Xk) is log-
concave on Xk since it satisfies the Bakry-Emer´y curvature
condition (16) with vk = 0 and σk = 1/
√
Rk where Rk >
0 is the minimum of the Ricci curvature on Xk. Thus by
section 2.5.1, it follows that our theorems hold. A prime
example of such a manifold is a p-sphere of radius r > 0,
thus with constant Ricci curvature (p − 1)/r2. For this
example (Gilmer et al., 2018b) is an instance (more on this
in section 3).
Application to the “Adversarial Spheres” problem. In
the recent recent “Adversarial Spheres” paper (Gilmer
et al., 2018b), wherein the authors consider a 2-class prob-
lem on a so-called “concentric spheres” dataset. This prob-
lem can be described in our notation as: PX|+ = uni-
form distribution on p-dimensional sphere of radius r+ and
PX|− = uniform distribution on p-dimensional sphere of
radius r−. The classification problem is to decide which
of the two concentric spheres a sampled point came from.
The authors (see Theorem 5.1 of mentioned paper) show
that for this problem, for large p and for any non-perfect
classifier h, the average `2 distance between a point and
the set of misclassified points is bounded as follows
`2(h) = O(Φ−1(acc(h|k))/√p). (17)
We now show how to obtain the above bound via a direct
application of our theorem 2. Indeed, since these spaces
are clearly compact Riemannian manifolds with constant
curvature (p − 1)/r2k, each PX|k is and instances of 2.5.3,
and so satisfies T2
(
r2k
p−1
)
. Consequently, our Theorem 2
kicks-in and bound the average distance of sample points
with true label k ∈ {±}, to the error set (set of misclassi-
fied samples):
• dgeo(h|k) ≤ rk√p−1 (
√
2 log(1/ err(h|k))) + √pi/2)
for the geodesic threat model (induced by the “great
circle” distance between points), and
• `2(h|k) ≤ rk√p−1 (
√
2 log(1/ err(h|k)) + √pi/2) for
the `2 threat model. This follows from the previous
inequality because the geodesic (aka great circle) dis-
tance between two points on a sphere is always larger
than the euclidean `2 distance between points.
To link more explicitly with the bound (17) proposed in
(Gilmer et al., 2018b), one notes the following elementary
(and very crude) approximation of Gaussian quantile func-
tion Φ−1(a) ≈ √2 log(1/(1− a)) for a ∈ [0, 1). Thus,
Φ−1(1 − err(h|k))/√p and √2 log(1/ err(h|k))/(p− 1)
are of the same order, for large p. Consequently, our bounds
can be seen as a strict generalization of the bounds in
(Gilmer et al., 2018b).
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2.5.4. LIPSCHITZ PUSHFORWARD OF A T2
DISTRIBUTION
Lemma 2.1 of (Djellout et al., 2004) ensures that if PX|k is
the pushforward via an Lk-Lipschitz map Tk : Zk → Xk
between metric spaces (an assumption which is implicitly
made when machine learning practitioners model images
using generative neural networks1, for example), of a dis-
tribution µk which satisfies T2(σ˜2k) onZk for some σ˜k > 0,
then PX|k satisfies T2(L2kσ˜
2
k) on Xk, and so Theorem 2
(and Corollary 1 for flat space) holds with σk = Lkσ˜k.
This is precisely the GAN-type data model assumed by
(Fawzi et al., 2018a), withZk := Rp′ and µk = N (0, σIp′)
for all k.
3. Related works
There is now a rich literature trying to understand ad-
versarial robustness. Just to name a few, let us mention
(Tsipras et al., 2018; Schmidt et al., 2018; Bubeck et al.,
2018; Gilmer et al., 2018b; Fawzi et al., 2018a; Mahlou-
jifar et al., 2018; Sinha et al., 2017). Below, we discuss
a representative subset of these works, which is most rele-
vant to our own contributions presented in this manuscript.
These all use some kind of Gaussian isoperimetric inequal-
ity (Boucheron et al., 2013), and turn out to be very spe-
cial cases of the general bounds presented in Theorem 2
and Corollary 1. See section 2.5 for a detailed discussion
on generality our results.
Gaussian and Bernoulli models. We have already men-
tioned the work (Tsipras et al., 2018), which first showed
that motivating problem presented in section 1.1, every
classifier can be fooled with high probability. In a fol-
lowup paper (Schmidt et al., 2018), the authors have also
suggested that the sample complexity for robust generaliza-
tion is much higher than for standard generalization. These
observations are also strengthened by independent works
of (Bubeck et al., 2018).
Adversarial spheres. The work which is most similar
in flavor to ours is the recent “Adversarial Spheres” pa-
per (Gilmer et al., 2018b), wherein the authors consider
a 2-class problem on classifying two concentric spheres in
Rp of different radii. The authors showed that the distance
of each point to the set of misclassified images is of order
O(1/√p). We discussed this work in detail in section 2.5
and showed that it follows directly from our Theorem 2.
1The Lipschitz constant of a feed-forward neural network
with 1-Lipschitz activation function, e.g ReLU, sigmoid, etc., is
bounded by the product of operator norms of the layer-to-layer
parameter matrices.
Hyper-cubes. Results for the the hyper-cube image
model considered in (Shafahi et al., 2018) can be recov-
ered by noting that the uniform measure on [0, 1]p is the
pushforward T#γp of the standard Gaussian on Rp, where
T : Rp → [0, 1]p is (2pi)−1/2-Lipschitz map defined by
T (z1, . . . , zp) := (Φ(z1), . . . ,Φ(zp)).
Generative models. In (Fawzi et al., 2018a), the au-
thors considered a scenario where data-generating process
is via passing a multivariate Gaussian distribution through
a Lipschitz continuous mapping g : Rm → X , called the
generator. The authors then studied the per-sample robust-
ness radius defined by rX (x, k) := inf{‖x′ − x‖2 s.t x′ ∈
X , h(x′) 6= k}. In the notation of our manuscript, this can
be rewritten as rX (x, k) := dX (x,B(h, k)), from which
it is clear that rX (x, k) ≤  iff x ∈ B(h, k). Using the
basic Gaussian isoperimetric inequality (Boucheron et al.,
2013), the authors then proceed to obtain bounds on the
probability that the classifier changes its output on an -
perturbation of some point on manifold the data manifold,
namely accswitch (h) := 1 −
∑
k pik err
switch
 (h|k), where
errswitch (h|k) := PX|k(Ck→()) = acc(h|k) err(h|k) and
Ck→() := B(h, k) − B(h, k) is the annulus in Fig. 1.
Our bounds in Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 can then be
seen as generalizing the methods and bounds in (Fawzi
et al., 2018a) to more general data distributions satisfying
W2 transportation-cost inequalities T2(c), with c > 0.
Distributional robustness and regularization. On a
completely different footing, (Blanchet & Murthy, 2016;
Mohajerin Esfahani & Kuhn, 2017; Sinha et al., 2017) have
linked distributional robustness to robust estimation theory
from classical statistics and regularization. An interesting
bi-product of these developments is that penalized regres-
sion problems like the square-root Lasso and sparse logis-
tic regression have been recovered as distributional robust
counterparts of the unregularized problems.
4. Experimental evaluation
We now present some empirical validation for our theoret-
ical results.
4.1. Simulated data
The simulated data are discussed in section 1.1: Y ∼
Bern({±1}), X|Y ∼ N (Y η, 1)×p, with p = 1000 where
η is an SNR parameter which controls the difficulty of the
problem. Here, The classifier h is a multi-layer perceptron
with architecture 1000→ 200→ 100→ 2 and ReLU acti-
vations. The results are are shown in Fig. 2 (Left). As pre-
dicted by our theorems, we observe that beyond the critical
value  = ∞(h) := σ
√
2 log(1/ err(h))/p = O˜(σ/√p),
where err(h) := 1 − acc(h), the adversarial accuracy
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acc(h) decays exponential fast, and passes below the hor-
izontal line err(h) as soon as  ≥ 2∞(h).
Figure 2. Illustrating The Extended “No Free Lunch” Theorem 1
for the `∞ threat model on the classification problems. Left: Sim-
ulated data (Tsipras et al., 2018) (discused in section 1.1) with
with p = 10000 and SNR parameter η = 1. The classifier h
is a multi-layer perceptron with architecture 10000 → 200 →
100→ 2. As  is increased, the robust accuracy (only shown here
for the class k = 0, but results for the class k = 1 are similar)
degrades slowly and then eventually hits a phase-transition point
 = ∞(h|0); it then decays exponentially fast, and the perfor-
mance is eventually reduced to chance level. This is as predicted
by our Theorems 2 and 1. Right: MNIST dataset. The classifier
h is a deep feed-forward CNN (Conv2d → Conv2d → 320 →
10) is trained using PyTorch https://pytorch.org/ to pre-
dict MNIST classification problem. The pattern of decay of the
adversarial accuracy similar to that on the simulated, indicating
that this real dataset might also suffer from concentration, allow-
ing our theorems to apply.
4.2. Real data
Wondering whether the phase transition and bounds pre-
dicted by Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 holds for real
data, we trained a deep feed-forward CNN (architecture:
Conv2d → Conv2d → 320 → 10) for classification on
the MNIST dataset (LeCun & Cortes, 2010), a standard
benchmark problem in supervised machine-learning. The
results are shown in Fig. 2. This model attains a classi-
fication accuracy of 98% on held-out data. We consider
the performance of the model on adversarialy modified im-
ages according to the `∞ threat model, at a given toler-
ance level (maximum allowed modification per pixel) . As
 is increased, the performance degrades slowly and then
eventually hits a phase-transition point; it then decays ex-
ponentially fast and the performance is eventually reduced
to chance level. This behavior is in accordance with Corol-
lary 1, and suggests that the range of applicability of our
results may be much larger than what we have been able to
theoretically establish in Theorem 2 and Corollary 1.
Of course, a more extensive experimental study would be
required to strengthen this empirical observation.
5. Concluding remarks
We have shown that on a very broad class of data distribu-
tions, any classifier with even a bit of accuracy is vulnerable
to adversarial attacks. Our work uses powerful tools from
geometric probability theory to generalize all the main im-
possibility results that have appeared in adversarial robust-
ness literature. Moreover, our results would encourage one
to conjecture that the modulus of concentration of probabil-
ity distribution (e.g in T2 inequalities) on a manifold com-
pletely characterizes the adversarial or distributional robust
accuracy in classification problems.
Redefine the rules of the game ? A limitation for adver-
sarial robustness, as universal our strong No Free Lunch
Theorem we have developed in this paper could indicate
that the attack models currently being considered in the lit-
erature, namely additive perturbations measured in the `0,
`1, `2, `∞, etc. norms, and in which the attacker can make
as many queries as they which, may be too lax. Just like
in coding theory where a rethinking of the constraints on
a channel leads to the Shannon limit to be improved, one
could hope that a careful rethink of the constraints put on
the adversarial attacker might alleviate the pessimistic ef-
fect of our impossibility results. As remarked in (Gilmer
et al., 2018a), it is not even clear if the current existing at-
tack models are most plausible.
Future directions. One could consider the following
open questions, as natural continuation of our work:
• Extend Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 to more general
data distributions.
• Study more complex threat models, e.g small defor-
mations.
• Fine grained analysis of sample complexity and com-
plexity of hypotheses class, with respect to adversarial
and distributional robustness. This question has been
partially studied in (Schmidt et al., 2018; Bubeck
et al., 2018) in the adversarial case, and (Sinha et al.,
2017) in the distributional robust scenario.
• Study more general threat models. (Gilmer et al.,
2018a) has argued that most of the proof-of-concept
problems studied in theory papers might not be com-
pletely aligned with real security concerns faced by
machine learning applications. It would be interest-
ing to see how the theoretical bounds presented in our
manuscript translate on real-world datasets, beyond
the MNIST on which we showed some preliminary
experimental results.
• Develop more geometric insights linking adversarial
robustness and curvature of decision boundaries. This
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view was first introduced in (Fawzi et al., 2018b).
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(Supplementary material) Limitations of Adversarial Robustness: Strong No
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Elvis Dohmatob 1
A. Proofs
Proof of claims on the toy problem from section 1.1.
These claims were already proved in (Tsipras et al., 2018).
We provide a proof here just for completeness.
Now, one computes
acc(havg) := P(X,Y ) (havg(X) = Y ) = P
(
Y wTX ≥ 0)
= PY
(Y/(p− 1))∑
j≥2
N (ηY, 1) ≥ 0

= P (N (η, 1/(p− 1)) ≥ 0) = P (N (0, 1/(p− 1)) ≥ −η)
= P (N (0, 1/(p− 1)) ≤ η) ≥ 1− e−(p−1)η2/2,
which is ≥ 1 − δ if η ≥ √2 log(1/δ)/(p− 1). Likewise,
for  ≥ η, it was shown in (Tsipras et al., 2018) that the
adversarial robustness accuracy of havg writes
acc(havg) := P(X,Y ) (Y havg(X + ∆x) ≥ 0 ∀‖∆x‖∞ ≤ )
= P(X,Y )
(
inf
‖∆x‖∞≤
Y wT (X + ∆x) ≥ 0
)
= P(X,Y )
(
Y wTX − ‖Y w‖1 ≥ 0
)
= P(X,Y )
(
Y wTX −  ≥ 0)
= P(N (0, 1/(p− 1)) ≥ − η) ≤ e−(p−1)(−η)2/2.
Thus acc(havg) ≤ δ for  ≥ η +
√
2 log(1/δ)/(p− 1),
which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let h : X → {1, . . . ,K} be a clas-
sifier, and for a fixed class label k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}, de-
fine the set B(h, k) := {x ∈ X |h(x) 6= k}. Because
we only consider PX|Y -a.e continuous classifiers, each
B(h, k) is Borel. Conditioned on the event “y = k”,
the probability of B(h, k) is precisely the average error
1Criteo, Paris, France. 2AUTHORERR: Missing
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made by the classifier h on the class label k. That is,
acc(h|k) = 1−PX|k(B(h, k)). Now, the assumptions im-
ply by virtue of Lemma 1, that PX|k has the BLOWUP(c)
property. Thus, if  ≥ σk
√
2 log(1/(PX|Y (B(h, k)) =
σk
√
2 log(1/ err(h|k) =: (h|k), then one has
acc(h|k) = 1− PX|k(B(h, k)dgeo)
≤ e−
1
2σ2
k
(−σk
√
2 log(1/(PX|k(B(h,k)))
2
= e
− 1
2σ2
k
(−σk
√
2 log(1/ err(h|k))2
= e
− 1
2σ2
k
(−(h|k))2
≤ e−
1
2σ2
k
(h|k)2
= err(h|k), if  ≥ 2(h|k).
On the other hand, it is clear that acc(h|k) ≤ acc(h|k) for
any  ≥ 0 since B(h, k) ⊆ B(h, k) for any threat model.
This concludes the proof of part (A). For part (B), define
the random variable Z := d(X,B(h, k)) and note that
d(h|k) := EX|k[d(X,B(h, k))] =
∫ ∞
0
PX|k(Z ≥ )d
=
∫ (h|k)
0
PX|k(Z ≥ )d+
∫ ∞
(h|k)
PX|k(Z ≥ )d
≤ (h|k) +
∫ ∞
(h|k)
PX|k(Z ≥ )d, as PX|k(Z ≥ ) ≤ 1
≤ (h|k) +
∫ ∞
(h|k)
e
− 1
2σ2
k
(−(h|k))2
d, by inequality (9)
= (h|k) + σk
√
2pi
2
(∫ ∞
−∞
1
σk
√
2pi
e
− 1
2σ2
k
2
d
)
= (h|k) + σk
√
2pi
2
= σk
(√
log(1/ err(h|k)) +
√
pi
2
)
,
which is the desired inequality.
Proof of Corollary 1. For flat geometry Xk = Rp; part
(A1) of Corollary 1 then follows from Theorem 2 and the
equivalence of `q norms, in particular
‖x‖2 ≤ p1/2−1/q‖x‖q, (18)
for all x ∈ Rp and for all q ∈ [1,∞]. Thus we have the
blowup inclusion B(h, k)p
1/2−1/q
`2
⊆ B(h, k)`q . Part (B1)
is just the result restated for q = ∞. The proofs of parts
(A2) and (B2) trivially follow from the inequality (18).
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Remark 2. Note that the particular structure of the error
set B(h, k) did not play any part in the proof of Theorem
2 or of Corollary 1, beyond the requirement that the set be
Borel. This means that we can obtain and prove analogous
bounds for much broader class of losses. For example, it
is trivial to extend the theorem to targeted attacks, wherein
the attacker can aim to change an images label from k to a
particular k′.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let B be a Borel subset of X = (X , d)
with µ(B) > 0, and let µ|B be the restriction of µ onto B
defined by µ|B(A) := µ(A∩B)/µ(B) for every BorelA ⊆
X . Note that µ|B  µ with Radon-Nikodym derivative
dµ|B
dµ =
1
µ(B)1B . A direct computation then reveals that
kl(µ|B‖µ) =
∫
log
(
dµ|B
dµ
)
dµ|B
=
∫
B
log
(
1
µ(B)
)
dµ|B
= log(1/µ(B))µ|B(B) = log
(
1
µ(B)
)
.
On the other hand, if X is a random variable with law µ|B
andX ′ is a random variable with law µ|X\B , then the def-
inition of B ensures that d(X,X ′) ≥  µ-a.s, and so by
definition (??), one has W2(µ|B , µ|X\B) ≥ . Putting
things together yields
 ≤W2(µ|B , µX\B) ≤W2(µ|B , µ) +W2(µ|X\B , µ)
≤
√
2c kl(µ|B‖µ) +
√
2c kl(µ|X\B‖µ)
≤
√
2c log(1/µ(B)) +
√
2c log(1/µ(X \B))
=
√
2c log(1/µ(B)) +
√
2c log(1/(1− µ(B)),
where the first inequality is the triangle inequality for
W2 and the second is the T2(c) property assumed in the
Lemma. Rearranging the above inequality gives√
2c log(1/(1− µ(B))) ≥ −
√
2c log(1/µ(B)),
Thus, if  ≥ √2c log(1/µ(B)), we can square both sides,
multiply by c/2 and apply the increasing function t 7→ et,
to get the claimed inequality.
B. Distributional No “Free Lunch” Theorem
As before, let h : X → Y be a classifier and  ≥ 0 be a tol-
erance level. Let a˜cc(h) denote the distributional robust-
ness accuracy of h at tolerance , that is the worst possible
classification accuracy at test time, when the conditional
distribution P is changed by at most  in the Wasserstein-1
sense. More precisely,
a˜cc(h) := inf
Q∈P(X×Y), W1(Q,P )≤
Q(h(x) = y), (19)
where the Wasserstein 1-distance W1(Q,P ) (see equation
(??) for definition) in the constraint is with respect to the
pseudo-metric d˜ on X × Y defined by
d˜((x′, y′), (x, y)) :=
{
d(x′, x), if y′ = y,
∞, else.
The choice of d˜ ensures that we only consider alternative
distributions that conserve the marginals piy; robustness is
only considered w.r.t to changes in the class-conditional
distributions PX|k.
Note that we can rewrite a˜cc(h) = 1− e˜rr(h),
e˜rr(h) := sup
Q∈P(X×Y), W1(Q,P )≤
Q(X ∈ B(h, Y )), (20)
where is the distributional robustness test error and
B(h, y) := {x ∈ X |h(x) 6= y} as before. Of course, the
goal of a machine learning algorithm is to select a classifier
(perhaps from a restricted family) for which the average
adversarial accuracy acc(h) is maximized. This can be
seen as a two player game: the machine learner chooses
a strategy h, to which an adversary replies by choosing a
perturbed version Q ∈ P(X × Y) of the data distribution,
used to measure the bad event “h(X) 6= Y ”.
It turns out that the lower bounds on adversarial accuracy
obtained in Theorem 2 apply to distributional robustness as
well.
Corollary 2 (No “Free Lunch” for distributional robust-
ness). Theorem 2 holds for distributional robustness, i.e
with acc(h|k) replaced with a˜cc(h|k).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proof of Corollary 2. We will use a dual representation of
a˜cc(h|k) to establish that a˜cc(h|k) ≤ acc(h|k). That
is, distributional robustness is harder than adversarial ro-
bustness. In particular, this will allow us apply the lower
bounds on adversarial accuracy obtained in Theorem 2 to
distributional robustness as well!
So, for λ ≥ 0, consider the convex-conjugate of (x, y) 7→
1x∈B(h,y) with respect to the pseudo-metric d˜, namely
1λd˜x∈B(h,y) := sup
(x′,y′)∈X×Y
1x′∈B(h) − λd˜((x′, y′), (x, y)).
A straightforward computation gives
1λd˜x∈B(h,y) := sup
(x′,y′)∈X×Y
1x′∈B(h,y′) − λd˜((x′, y′), (x, y))
= max
B∈{B(h,y), X\B(h,y)}
sup
x′∈B
1x′∈B(h,y) − λd(x′, x)
= max(1− λd(x,B(h, y)),−λd(x,X \B(h, y)))
= (1− λd(x,B(h, y)))+.
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Now, since the transport cost function d˜ is nonnegative and
lower-semicontinuous, strong-duality holds (Villani, 2008;
Blanchet & Murthy, 2016) and one has
sup
W1(Q,P )≤
Q(h(X) 6= Y )
= inf
λ≥0
sup
Q
(Q(X ∈ B(h, Y )) + λ(−W1(Q,P )))
= inf
λ≥0
(
sup
Q
(Q(X ∈ B(h, Y ))− λW1(Q,P )) + λ
)
= inf
λ≥0
(E(x,y)∼P [1λd˜x∈B(h,y)] + λ)
= inf
λ≥0
(E(x,y)∼P [(1− λd(x,B(h, y)))+] + λ)
= P (X ∈ B(h, Y )λ−1∗ ),
where λ∗ = λ∗(h) ≥ 0 is the (unique!) value of λ at which
the infimum is attained and we have used the previous com-
putations and the handy formula
sup
Q
(Q(X ∈ B(h, Y ))− λW1(Q,P )) = EP [1λd˜X∈B(h,Y )],
which is a direct consequence of Remark 1 of (Blanchet &
Murthy, 2016). Furthermore, by Lemma 2 of (Blanchet &
Murthy, 2016), one has
 ≤
∑
k
pik
∫
B(h,k)λ
−1∗
d(x,B(h, k))dPX|k(x)
≤
∑
k
pikλ
−1
∗ PX|k(X ∈ B(h, k)λ
−1
∗ )
= λ−1∗ P (X ∈ B(h, Y )λ
−1
∗ ) ≤ λ−1∗ .
Thus λ−1∗ ≥  and combining with the previous inequalities
gives
sup
Q∈P(X ), W1(Q,P )≤
Q(h(X) 6= Y ) ≥ P (X ∈ B(h, Y )λ−1∗ )
≥ P (X ∈ B(h, Y )).
Finally, noting that acc(h) = 1− P (X ∈ B(h, Y )), one
gets the claimed inequality a˜cc(h) ≤ acc(h).
